In “A Journey Through Time” I stated as follows: While the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s witnessed the emergence of two institutional platforms – the NCNC and the Igbo state Union- that aggregated Igbo group interest on the political, social and cultural frontiers, and provided coherence, order, logic and direction to Igbo political quest… the contemporary epoch is devoid of any platform recognized, accepted and adopted by the generality of the people as their own.
Continuing, I also stressed that: Rent by internecine and fratricidal political infighting and over burdened by lack of clear sighted grand political strategy, vision and ideals commonly accepted by all the people, and not the factions of the various political elite, Igbo society currently drifts, buffeted by clashing political winds that scatter the people in several directions.

Without a doubt, there is an evolving national political consensus, which underpins the contestation for power, influence and space by the various ethno-national and geo-political coalitions and formations. Geo-strategic capacity determines the ability of each federating unit to buy into and help in driving emerging national scenarios and, consequently, in negotiating political and other national conditions favourable to their people. A few examples will suffice here. Since the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, the Yoruba nation developed a grand political strategy that seemingly sublimated the quest for ethnic survival under a grandiose pro-democracy package.

Through this, they expanded the reach and range of agitation to encompass other progressive political formations in the East and the North. Propelled by a visible desire to restore electoral mandates and democratize society, but equally mindful of the fact that the terms of this negotiations will be favourable to them, Nigeria emerged at mid-1998 to the realization that a Nigerian presidency of a Yoruba extraction had become inevitable.

Interestingly, the fact that the PDP eventually produced Olusegun Obasanjo as its presidential flag bearer (the least of acceptable Yoruba choice) and the AD-APP alliance threw up Olu Falae as its presidential candidate (a more acceptable Yoruba choice) showed the geo-strategic capacity of the Yoruba nation in determining the direction of the Nigerian state favourable to them.

When Nigerians thus went to the pools in February 1999, they had a limited choice: to elect one out of two Yoruba candidates. Ultimately, the mainstream Yoruba political tendency got what they demanded; a Yoruba president, but not the candidate of their choice. This, of course, is realistic in the context of every political negotiation: the sense of accommodation, the striking of balance, the building of consensus, etc.

Another example that readily comes to my mind is the patience of the Northern, mainstream political establishment who endured the 8 years of Obasanjo’s insufferable mischief, highhandedness and a far-reaching strategic agenda of de-constructing Northern political power structure and base, a process that reached its high water mark in the perfidious Third Term, Life Presidency project.

Their ability to withstand Obasanjo’s “Shock and awe” political tactics, to attenuate personality differences and ego in favour of group interest, and to finally compel Obasanjo to abdicate power in favour of a president of Northern extraction is a testimony to their staying power, the corrections of their political vision and the relative success of their grand power strategy. Yet, as in the case of the 1999 political transition; and given the complications of the April 2007 general elections, the North may not have got all that they demanded, but they have secured the space to operate, to manoeuvre, and to begin the urgent task of re-constructing and re-constituting their political base which Obasanjo dealt a harsh, 8- year blow. Thus, without a clear political strategy, without a well-developed political programme, and without a commensurate level of intellectual and strategic thinking they wouldn’t have achieved the much they did.

The third and last example I will give pertains to the grand political strategy of the Southern minorities who inhabit the South-South geo-political zone. This grand strategy nearly delivered the Nigerian presidency to the zone, has made the Niger Delta region the hottest national topic and the international security concerns of the Big western powers in Africa; and delivered the nation’s Vice President to them virtually on a platter of gold. The far- reaching implication of this last political set up is that it has successfully negated and deconstructed the prevalent historical power – sharing arrangement in Nigeria given the examples of the 1960 post-colonial arrangement and the 1979 post-military political arrangement.

Yes, the Niger Delta still bristles with poverty, ecological and environmental disaster, militancy and seemingly intractable conflicts, yet it is, again a testimony to their sacrifice, steady political course, resolute will and a clear sighted strategic power agenda that have enhanced the region’s profile and made it the centre piece of virtually all national political and economic dialogues and discourses.

What about the Igbo nation? How far has it fared in the course of Nigeria’s contemporary history and democratic transition? Answers to these posers are not far fetched. In 1960 the Igbo-dominated NCNC shared political power with the NPC, a situation that produced a ceremonial Igbo president, a deep Igbo presence in the Federal Cabinet and Strategic Igbo placements in the civil service. In 1979, barely 9 years after the civil war which the Igbo-led Biafra lost, they also produced the nation’s Vice President, the Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives and choice cabinet appointment, essentially because of the alliance between the Igbo dominated NPP and the ruling NPN.

Yet, in 1999, a clear 8 years after the relatively golden moment in Igbo political history they failed in their charge to produce the nation’s President, they also lost the Vice Presidential slot; they had to beg for accommodation at the strategic sectors of the federal cabinet, and even when eventually the President of the Senate became the only visible political bargain they could muster, it became over time a symbol of group failure and an illustration of the deep penetration of Igbo politics by outside forces, aided, I would say, by the dominant position occupied by the clientele class on Igbo politics.

It was therefore not surprising that between 1999 and 2007, Igbo land had produced 5 Senate Presidents, one for each core Igbo states, not as matter of group choice but a consequence of group vulnerability. This clearly absurd scenario became an eloquent testament of the disdain a number of people held for the Igbo elite, and a clear demonstration of the Igbo lack of a credible political platform, abiding Igbo state socio-cultural union capable of mobilization progressive forces in Igbo land and an absence of strategic thinking and intellectual depth in Igbo political calculation.

Today, Igbo land has been downgraded one step back from the Senate Presidency to the Deputy Senate Presidency, while the group that produced the nation’s Presidency for 8 years is today still rewarded with the Speakership of the House of Representatives and a very powerful Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the ruling PDP. The chance to produce the chairman of the ruling party is scant consolation given the power dynamics of the Nigerian state, and the location of real, concrete and effectual power in the polity.

Igbo political power base is in urgent and dire need of re-construction and re-constitution. I have tried to present the limit situations that make this process a difficult one. Yet it is, as the saying goes, a task that must be accomplished.

To achieve it will demand time, tact, strategic thinking and profound intellectual ability. This agenda must balance the interests and needs of the Igbo with the interests and needs of the other groups that constitute Nigeria. It also requires capacity in the area of strategic networking, consensus building and multi-layered dialogues across the ethnic and geo-political lines.

But most importantly, it will require rooting out the clientele Igbo political elite from the Igbo political space, so that the people can re-discover themselves, breath fresh political air, and begin the task of their re-humanization.