| The futility of war
By Sabella Ogbobode Abidde
Wednesday,
August 23, 2006
Since recorded history, there have been lots of wars and
none has ever totally achieved its stated goal. There have
been civil wars, extortionate wars, war of attrition, religious
wars, colonial and liberation wars, proxy wars, Cold War and
dynastic wars.
Either way one looks at it, wars are generally deemed lose-lose
situations. And because wars are unpredictable, there are
rarely winners since both sides suffer mental and physical
harm. And no one who has ever been to a war or witnessed wars
would ever wish for another war, save for a mad man. Sadly
and unfortunately, the world is full of mad men, rogue regimes
and leaders possessed by hubris with a willingness to send
young men and women to their early death.
Wars are atrocious. From Cicero to St. Thomas Aquinas, and
from Hugo Grotius to Immanuel Kant, Timothy Jackson, Sari
Nusseibeh and George Weigel, scholars up and down the ages
have written about wars -- especially "just wars."
St Augustine, for instance, justified war if one was defending
against unprovoked external aggression, recapturing things
taken, i.e. territory; and punishing those who committed egregious
harm, i.e. genocide. In recent years, the United States Catholic
Conference averred that "force may be used only to correct
a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation
of the basic human rights of whole populations."
By executive order, government fiat or a declaration by Congress,
war can begin. In other words, it is easy to start a war;
but, putting a stop to war is very difficult because of the
ensuing enmity, negotiations, jostling and hustling of positions
and boundaries.
And even when there is cessation of hostility, provisions
has to be made for lasting peace (peacekeeping) between the
warring parties. Also, individual nations have to care for
the wounded in addition to paying compensation to the families
of the deceased. It should also be noted that rebuilding the
infrastructures can sometimes task a nation's economy. And
in fact, ten to fifteen years after cessation of hostilities,
most African nations have yet to recover from the ravages
of war. Angola and Mozambique are cases in point. And indeed,
some believe that Nigeria is yet to recover from the 1967-70
civil war.
As destructive as wars are, they are also unpredictable. For
instance, no nation that started a major war, either in the
twentieth or twenty-fist century, has ever emerged victorious.
Germany and Austria-Hungary that started World War I went
down in defeat; Saddam Hussein lost during the first Gulf
War, and the United States is no where near victory in the
ongoing war; Slobodan Milosevic and his henchmen were the
losers for starting the Balkans war in the 1980s; and the
recent Israeli-Hezbollah war has turned out to be a draw.
What did Israel gain? Instead of swapping two prisoners, they
have now lost face, lost about fifty soldiers and dozens of
civilians in addition to incurring loss of revenue and damaged
infrastructures. How wise is that?
They expected to deliver a knockout blow to the jugular of
the Hezbollah. That didn't happen. In the end, Israel would
still have to engage in prisoners' exchange. As a result of
the unintended consequence of the war, Hezbollah and its leaders
are about to ride into town on a horse back -- seen as heroes
within and outside of the Middle East.
But is this the end of the skirmish? I doubt it! Not as long
as the root cause of the war remains unsolved. Somehow, I
also doubt if Israel would allow Hassan Nasrallah to "go
and come at will." Even so, the universal lesson here
is this: unless you attend to the root causes of a problem,
no amount of cosmetic surgery would do. That is to say that
even if Nasrallah was/is eliminated, Hezbollah and HAMAS and
the underlining problems would not go away.
Although it is too early to tell, most analysts are likely
to declare the Israeli-Hezbollah skirmish a draw: no victor
no vanquished. And here is why: The Prime Minister of Israel,
Ehud Olmert gravely underestimated the tenacity, the might
and intelligence of Hezbollah and its leader Sheik Hassan
Nasrallah; secondly, the Israeli government did not consider
or anticipate the ensuing global outcry to the war, and also
assumed that the Israeli public would give the government
a carte blanche approval to go to war; thirdly, Olmert wanted
to prove to himself and to the Israeli public that he has
what it took to be an Ariel Sharon, and like Sharon, he could
squash Hezbollah.
Unfortunately, he forgot two things: he is not Sharon; and
Sharon failed in his attempt to asphyxiate and then decapitate
Hezbollah.
And finally, Olmert blindly followed the advice of President
Bush (with the hope that, somehow, Iran and Syria could be
lured into the fight). If Iran had taken the bait, Tehran
would have been leveled; and Damascus made to beg for her
life. Bush was willing to just "slap and forgive"
Syria; but not so with Iran. Nothing short of an overkill
of Iran would have satisfied Bush.
But somehow, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran) and President
Bashar al-Asad (Syria) wised up to the calculation and "stayed
away."
Did Hezbollah and her backers think Israel was going to engage
in an all out attack when they kidnapped the two or three
Israeli soldiers? I doubt it! In all probability they thought
Israel was going to look the other way and may be agree to
prisoners' exchange. After all, Ehud Olmert is not Ariel Sharon;
and so they mistook him for a "softie." This was
a blunder on the part of Hassan Nasrallah: a misreading of
his adversary's character.
For that reason Lebanon has lost millions of dollars in tourist
revenue, incurred damages to bridges, homes and other infrastructures.
But more than that, hundreds lost their lives and thousands
more became refugees in their own country. A whole lot of
people would be angry at Hezbollah for bringing their "house
down." Now and for the next three or more years, they
have to rebuild a country that was just coming of a protracted
civil war.
There are lessons for all parties to learn here. And in fact,
some of these lessons may not be apparent for two or more
years. In the end though, the Israeli government must rethink
its hastiness to go to war. Looking at the larger picture,
however, one thing is clear: the State of Israel must grant
statehood to the Palestinians in order to put a stop to these
circle of war-peace-war-peace. What is needed is a permanent
peace. And this can only come about if Tel Aviv recognizes
the right of the Palestinians to self-government. After all
these years, I still do not understand why Israel would want
to keep lording over their neighbour. It simply doesn't make
sense.
Sabidde@yahoo.com
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