By Emma Emeozor
Soldiers, like any other group of professionals in the service of a nation, have the right to demand for improved welfare package, including the payment of outstanding bonuses. But how such demand is made is important as it could spark a reign of terror on the people, if not outright civil war, especially in a nation lacking political stability. It is for this reason the recent army mutiny in Ivory Coast raises concerns.
A group of soldiers staged a mutiny to force the government to pay their outstanding bonuses. The soldiers did not only take to the streets but fired rocket launchers to express their seriousness just as they took the Defense Minister, Alain-Richard Donwahi, hostage. The mutin, which started in the country’s second largest city, Bouake, soon spread to other towns: Man, Daloa, Daoukro, Odienne, Korhogo and even the capital, Abidjan. The unrest was halted only after the rebellious soldiers and the government reached a deal to meet their demands immediately.
Confirming the deal, President Alassane Outtara said: “This manner of making demands is not appropriate.” He then went on to say: “I confirm that I have agreed to take into account the demands of the soldiers over their bonuses and better working conditions.” Also, the government agreed to offer amnesty to the soldiers.
This is not the first army mutiny taking place in Ivory Coast. Between 1990 and 2016, no fewer than 26 army mutinies have been staged in the country. Put differently, disgruntled soldiers have taken mutiny as an instrument of intimidation to force the government to always accede to their demands.
Moreover, Ivory Coast is not the only African country where soldiers have mutinied. Elsewhere on the continent, soldiers have mutinied to effect regime change for the purpose of good governance and economic development; essentially, mutinies are staged by different soldiers for different reasons.
However, an analysis of the mutinies in Ivory Coast immediately highlights why African countries are not able to have cohesive and stable armies. Except for a handful of countries, governments on the continent are not able to enforce total discipline in the army because of intrinsic factors, particularly ethnicity. Ethnicity is a major determinant of the loyalty of soldiers to the government in power, contrary to the pledge of loyalty to the nation that soldiers usually make when they are recruited.
In other words, soldiers in Africa are yet to draw a line between loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the government of the day. In all the countries of the continent where mutinies, coups and counter-coups have occurred, ethnicity has been a prime factor. On the other hand, some leaders, even with poor records of performance, have remained in power with the support of soldiers from their ethnic group who (may) have become dominant in the army (courtesy of lopsided recruitments and promotions). Indeed, it has become a ritual for incoming leaders in Africa to screen the hierarchy of the army with a view to appointing army chiefs that are considered loyal and, in most cases, the major determinant of ‘loyalty’ is ethnic affiliation.
In Ivory Coast, the army became politicised after the death of its first post-independent President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, in 1993. Houphouet-Boigny united the Muslim-dominated north and the Christian-dominated south and encouraged migrants to come to work in the country. The policy enabled him not only to rule over united and happy citizens but also a growing economy that made the country a pride of the region.
Cracks in Ivory Coast’s government and economy started when the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bede, who succeeded Houphouet-Boigny “began consolidating political and military power for his ethnic group and capitalised on anti-immigrant sentiments with increasingly xenophobic policies based on the idea of Ivoirite or ‘Ivoirianess.’” The policy of Ivoirianess was discriminatory in its entirety and the victims were northerners and migrants from neighbouring countries. Reports said the policy “privileged the people of the south as ‘real’ citizens, and excluded the ‘foreigners’ from the north.” The height of provocation, fuelled by the gross implementation of the policy, came when Bede used it to scuttle the political ambition of Houphouet-Boigny’s former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara (now President). Ouattara, a northerner, has been accused of having parents from Burkina Faso.
“Bede used this rhetoric to pass legislation to prevent his primary political rival, Alassane Ouattara, from running in the 1995 election,” a report said. The seed of discord planted by Bede would grow and destroy the foundation laid by Houphouet-Boigny as “regional and ethnic identities” became the order in the country.
The level of ethnic groupings in the army came to a head when, in 1999, “dissatisfied army officers from excluded groups “led a mutiny and sacked Bede. General Robert Guei who led the coup became the head of state. But Guei was not a good student of history. He adopted the notorious policy of Ivoirianess and, again, stopped Ouattara from contesting in the election that held in October 2000.
With Ouattara disqualified, Guei and former President Laurent Gbagbo became the two rival candidates. Gbagbo was declared President only after mass protest, which forced Guei into exile.
Following the death Guei, two groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Ivoirian Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) emerged, “claiming to be fighting to avenge the death of Guei.”
Again, Gbagbo adopted the policy of ‘Ivoirianess.’ According to reports, “Gbagbo began to consolidate power for his own ethnic group and continued the exclusion of northerners in the government and military,” a development that “further increased the grievances and feeling of marginalisation among these groups.” By this time, the army had been completely politicised to the extent that various groups emerged under ethnic platforms, planning to plant their ethnic leaders in government.
The first reaction from the north came in September 2002, when “several northern army officers led an attempted coup. Led by Guillaume Soro, the officers and their supporters did not only form the New Forces (FN) but “quickly gained control of the northern half of the country, plunging the country into civil war.”
The war ended following the intervention of the United Nations and France. In 2007, Gbagbo and Soro signed the Ouagadougou Agreement. Under the agreement, Soro became prime minister, security sector reforms were outlined and the “buffer zone that divided the country was dismantled.”
But the agreement on security reforms was not implemented. Rather, the country was plunged into another era of political crisis following the presidential election in October 2010. Gbagbo and Ouattara were, again, the contestants. In that election neither candidate won in the first round. But when on December 2, 2010, the Independent Electoral Commission announced Ouattara winner with 54 per cent of the vote, the Constitutional Council declared the results invalid. It did not stop there but announced Gbagbo winner and he was sworn in as the new president on December 4, 2010.
Ouattara insisted he was the legitimately elected President. Thus, “despite the rhetoric of reunification, the country was still essentially split in two, with two armies and two separate chains of command that became partisan participants in the crisis.” In the ensuing crisis, northern soldiers were locked in war with southern soldiers, particularly those from Gbagbo’s ethnic group. No fewer than 3,000 soldiers died.
But beyond ethnic sentiments, how were some of the fighters recruited. Reports said they were recruited through promises made by Ouattara and Gbagbo, respectively, to their supporters. Of course, some of the soldiers, particularly from the north, were rebels whose mission was to install their son, Ouattara, in power.
It was this group of soldiers that staged the mutiny recently because their son had failed to honour the pledges he made. Rather, he announced a programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The programme has been slow “and a large number of small arms continue to circulate in the country.”
This situation is not peculiar to Ivory Coast. It does not give Africa a good image that, even in the 21st century, ethnicity is still a major factor determining the level of loyalty of the army in the countries of the continent. The army’s loyalty to its nation is a function of discipline and training. This should be the guiding principle all over the continent. The African Union must be seen to be encouraging its members not to politicise the armed forces. The AU should join in the training process of the army, not only for the purpose of peacekeeping in troubled countries, so that, with strict observance of ethic as a fundamental path to having a corps of professional soldiers, the armed forces would not get involved in politics.