It was July 5, 2022, 10:05 p.m. A frantic call came to Nigeria Info FM radio station’s late night programme that raised the alarm of  gunshots and explosions in an attack on the correctional centre in Kuje, located on the outskirts of Abuja.

      The caller simply announced that there were explosions and gunshots around the vicinity. The presenter, simply known as Black Coffee, was visibly shocked by the information as her voice tempo trembled. As a patriotic media lady, she instantly called on security agencies around Kuje and Abuja generally to immediately save the situation. Of course, that clarion call was not heeded because Abuja security agencies go to sleep like every civilian they were meant to secure. If they were not all asleep, how did 300 well-armed terrorists find their way into Kuje community and carry out a devastitating prisonbreak and rescue operation of their comrades that was believed to have lasted three hours? Curiously, there is a police station a few metres away from the road leading to the facility. Usually, police stations like the one in Kuje are staffed with between 30 and 40 officers, a strength not appreciatively enough for a local government, knowing full well that there is a correctional facility nearby.

In the midst of all these, report says that a convoy of three buses was sighted along the Airport-Kuje highway with escorts dressed in military camouflage hours before the attack. That report notwithstanding, the question is, how did the terrorists assemble before embarking on the night attack such that no eye saw them nor reported such a large gathering of armed and strange young men around the community, not even security agents living in the area were able to detect their presence? There should be a complete reorientation of  every security agent in Nigeria. That a security agent is not on duty does not exclude him or her from being extra-vigilant and reporting any act of insecurity.

It has been observed that the siting of the correctional facility is wrong, as long-range surveillance is obscured due to its location. More worrisome is the disclosure that several calls by this writer and other security observers of non-availability of electronic CCTV camera fell on the deaf ears of those heading correctional facilities around the country. Who should we hold responsible for this nonchalant and lackadaisical attitude? The minister, of course. A detailed analysis of the attack cannot be complete without a thorough check on the lonely road leading to the facility. It is a known fact that robbers and other criminals usually carry out suivelance check on their targets to obtain information, which is scrutinized before embarking on any attack. (Read my book “Dark Clouds: Confessions of Notorious Armed Robbers in Nigeria”). The question is, how come security personnel on sentry duty were unable to notice any rough-looking person, either pretending to be doing something, selling goods or loitering around theroad, gathering information?

Without information, these terrorists wouldn’t have been able to successfully carry out their dastardly attack on the facility. Unfortunately, at least 10 major jailbreaks have occurred under this administration headed by President Muhammadu Buhari and Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola as the minister for interior.

They happened in Owerri, Ikot Ekpene, Nsukka, Kogi, Benin, Okitipupa and Kuje, among others.  The most important question is, who failed to post military troops to the facility on that day or who ordered the withdrawal of the troops hours before the attack of the terrorists, as was alleged?

In fact the attack that witnessed the escape of hundreds of inmates, including terrorist prisoners who are Boko Haram members, has raised fundamental questions begging for answers from heads of FCT, Abuja, security agencies and Aregbesola, who had boasted after the second jailbreak was recorded in Kogi State that no such attack would ever take place under his watch. In other sane climes, the minister would have toed the path of integrity and resigned. Even when he decides not to throw in the towel, it was anticipated that Buhari would have compelled him to resign. Aregbesola has not effected any changes in all the correctional facilities around the country.  Is it not worrisome that our correctional facilities lack expected security? So what happened to all the approved budgets?

Retired Group Captain Sadeeq Shehu of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), who embarked on a personal, detailed security assessment at the scene of attack, said: “The Kuje prison attack was very successful because the minimum correctional facility in Kuje is designed to hold 560 inmates maximum but as at time of attack was holding some 1,000 inmates, less supervision.

“The main access road leading to the main gate is covered by trees and overgrown bushes such that one’s approach is effectively covered from sight of sentries at gate, even in daylight, not to say night effective fire.

“The outer perimeter wall is just about 6-7ft high, as against recommended height of 8-15ft.

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“Only one or two coils of razor wire placed on top of perimeter wall against recommended three coils, one on top the other.

“No second inner fence line, once you are over the first perimeter wall you’re through. Prison buildings should have outer and inner fence lines with a clear zone of at least 10 yards in between.

“The walls of the prison (which attackers broke) are of ordinary cement and block, instead of recommended four-inch-thick reinforced concrete wall or precast.

“There are two observation towers but not high enough with line of sight covered by trees and thick bushes. Additionally, being positioned deep inside building, instead of by the outer perimeter wall, the observation towers cannot serve the intended purpose, which is to be able to sight/engage with fire intruders far off before they even reach outer perimeter or raise alarm.

“A few CCTV cameras on the towers (dunno if working) but such CCTV should have been on the outer approaches.

“I observed a few fixed stationery security lights around but preferably movable lights that are wired to motion sensors so that they come on and point to area of intrusion. I confirm light was off during operation, which could be normal power outage, deliberate action or no standby power.

“On-site response force (according to NCS official who briefed press) is supposed to comprise 38 military, some unspecified police and civil defense and armed correctional service personnel but no clarity if these were on ground on particular day. Conflicting testimonies.

“The absence of any wounded or dead attacker left behind lends credence to the claim that all the armed defenders ran away without returning.”

Till date, no report of previous investigations on jailbreaks has seen the light of day. Would this also go the same Aregbesola way?